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Abstract
Information Quality (IQ) is a key success factor for the efficient
performance of any system, and it becomes a vital issue for critical
systems, where low-quality information may lead to disasters. De-
spite this, most of the Requirements Engineering frameworks loosely
define, or simply ignore such requirements, which may lead to differ-
ent conflicts among the stakeholders’ IQ requirements. In this paper,
we propose a novel conceptual framework for modeling and reasoning
about IQ at requirements level. The proposed framework is based
on the secure Tropos methodology and extends it with the required
concepts for modeling and analyzing IQ requirements since the early
phases of software development. A running example concerning a U.S
stock market crash (the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash) is used throughout
the paper.
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Requirements Engineering, Information Quality, Modeling, Reasoning
1 Introduction
Information Quality (IQ) is a key success factor for organizations, since de-
pending on low-quality information may cause severe consequences [32], or
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even disasters in the case of critical systems. Despite its importance, IQ is
often loosely defined, or simply ignored [15]. In general, quality has been de-
fined as “fitness for use” [18], or as in [33] the conformance to specifications,
i.e., meeting or exceeding consumer expectations.
For example, consider a stock market investor who uses his laptop to trade
some securities, the level of IQ required by him concerning his trades is not
the same as the IQ level required by a main stock market (e.g., NYSE, NAS-
DAQ) that is responsible of managing thousands of trades in milliseconds
simultaneously. In the first case, low-quality information can be accepted to
a certain level, while in the second case it may result in a financial disaster
(e.g., stock market crash, or at least loses of millions of dollars).
Several techniques for dealing with IQ have been proposed in the litera-
ture (e.g., integrity constraints [27]). However, they mainly focus on technical
aspects of IQ and do not solve problems that may rise at organizational or
social levels. More specifically, these techniques do not satisfy the needs
of complex systems these days, such as socio-technical systems [12], where
humans and organizations are integral part of the system along with the
technical elements such as software and hardware (e.g., healthcare systems,
smart cities, etc.). In these cases, requirements about IQ should be extended
to a socio-technical analysis.
For example, the Flash Crash was not caused by a mere technical failure,
but it was due to undetected vulnerabilities that manifested themselves in the
interactions of the stock market systems that led to a failure in overall socio-
technical system [40]. In particular, several reasons contributed to the Flash
Crash were caused by socio-technical IQ related issues. For instance, accord-
ing to [20] some traders intentionally provide falsified information. Others
continue trading during the crash by forwarding their orders to the markets
that did not halt their trading activities due to lake of coordination among
the markets, where the lack of coordination resulted also from IQ related
vulnerabilities. More specifically, most of these issues resulted from conflicts
among the IQ requirements of the stakeholders of the system. However, such
failures could be avoided if the IQ requirements of the system-to-be were
captured properly during the system design.
We advocate that answering “why” IQ related mechanisms and solutions
are needed, and not just “what” mechanisms and solutions are needed to
solve IQ related problems can provide a better understanding of stakeholders’
needs that are beyond IQ requirements. Moreover, it enables for detecting
any IQ requirements conflicts and resolving them at the early phases of the
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system design.
The framework presented in this paper uses a Goal-Oriented Require-
ments Engineering (GORE) approach. Among the several GORE approaches
offered in the literature (e.g., KAOS [9], i* [47]), we adopted secure Tropos
[28] as a baseline for our framework. Secure Tropos introduces primitives for
modeling actors of the system along with their objectives, entitlements and
capabilities. Goals are used to represent the strategic interest of actors, and
can be refined through And/ Or decomposition of a root goal into sub-goals.
Resources are used to represent both physical and informational entities that
are needed/ produced for/by the achievement of goals. Moreover, secure Tro-
pos provides the notion of delegation to model the transfer of responsibilities
among actors of the system.
Finally, it adopts the notion of trust and distrust to capture the expec-
tations of a trustor in the behavior of a trustee concerning a trustum. Our
framework extends the conceptual framework of secure Tropos by providing
the required concepts and constructs for modeling and reasoning about IQ
requirements. It allows the analyst to identify clearly “why” a certain level of
quality of a specific information is needed and not only “what” and “where”
such information is needed.
The paper is organized as follows; Section (§2) describes our motivating
example, while in Section (§3) we discuss the different problems related to
capturing IQ. In Section (§4), we outline the limitation in secure Tropos for
dealing with IQ, and then we propose the required extensions. In Section
(§5), we present the reasoning techniques that our framework offers. Section
(§6) implement and evaluates the proposed framework. Section (§7) presents
the related work. Finally, we conclude and discuss the future work at Section
(§8).
2 Motivating Example
Our motivating example concerns the May 6, 2010 U.S stock Flash Crash, in
which the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) dropped about 1000 points
(9% of its value) , and then it recovers those losses within minutes. This
section is organized as follows, (1) we briefly describe the main stock market
stakeholders along with their goals; (2) we list the 2010 Flash Crash chronol-
ogy of events; then (3) we discuss the main theories about the reasons that
led to the Flash Crash.
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Figure 1: A partial goal model concerning the U.S stock market structure
2.1 The stock market system structure
Based on [20], we can identify several stakeholders including: stock investors
are individuals or companies, who have a main goal of “making profit from
trading securities”, which is And decomposed into two goals “Produce sell/buy
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orders for targeted securities” and “Analyze the market for targeted secu-
rities”, where the first goal produces “Inv- Sell/ Buy orders”. While the
last goal is Or decomposed into two goals, “Analyze the market depending
on trader” that needs to consume “Tr trading suggestions” (provided by a
trader), and “Analyze the market depending on consulting firm” that needs
to consume “Con trading suggestion” (provided by a consulting firm).
Stock traders are persons or companies involved in trading securities in
stock markets with a main goal of “making profit by trading securities” either
for their own sake or by trading on behalf of their investors. According to [20],
traders can be classified under several categories, including: Fundamental
traders : are able to either buy or sell a significant number of securities with a
low trading frequency rate; Market Makers : facilitate trading on a particular
security in the market, and they are able to trade large number of securities;
High-Frequency Traders (HFTs): are able to trade with very high trading
frequency; Small traders : trade small amount of securities with very low
trading frequency.
While stock markets are places where traders gather and trade securities,
which have a main goal of “Make profit by facilitating the trades among stock
traders” that is And decomposed into two sub goals “Manage order match-
ing among traders” and “Ensure fair and stable trading environment”, where
the first intend to receive, match and perform orders from different traders,
and the last is responsible of halting or slowing down the trading frequency
in order to stabilize the trading environment when necessary. Moreover,
consulting firms are firms specialized for providing professional advices con-
cerning financial securities to traders and investors for a fee. Finally, credit
assessment ratings firms are firms with a main objective of providing assess-
ments of the credit worthiness of companies’ securities, i.e., such firms help
traders in deciding how risky it is to invest money in a certain security.
Figure 1 shows a portion of the secure Tropos representation of the stock
market structure. Secure Tropos is able to capture the social/ organizational
context of the system, but it does not offer primitives to model needs about
IQ, i.e., it deals with information whether they are available or not and
who is responsible about their delivery. For example, secure Tropos is able
to model information provision between investors and traders, and between
traders and markets. Yet, it does not provide concepts that enable to analyze
the quality of the provided information (e.g., accurate, complete, consistent,
etc.).
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2.2 The Flash Crash: chronology of events
The following sequence of events is based on both the joint report of CFTC
and SEC regarding the market events of May 6, 2010 [42, 36] and Nanex1
Flash Crash summary report [1].
• On May 6, U.S. stock markets opened and trended down for most of
the day on worries about the European debt crisis (Greece).
• By 2:30 p.m., the selling pressure had pushed the DJIA down about
2.5% of its value.
• At 2:32 p.m., a large fundamental trader initiated a sell program to
sell a total of 75,000 E-Mini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1
billion). The sell was initially absorbed by HFTs and fundamental
buyers. Usually, such big sell order may take more than 5 hours to
execute. However, on May 6, it was executed extremely fast in only 20
minutes.
• Between 2:41 p.m. and 2:44 p.m., HFTs and other traders drove the
price of the E-Mini down by more than 5%.
• At 2:45:28 p.m., trading on the E-Mini was paused for five seconds when
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), CME Circuit Breakers (CB)2
was triggered in order to prevent a cascade of further price declines.
Yet NYSE did not halt trading [41].
• At 2:45:33 p.m., prices stabilized when trading resumed, and the E-
Mini began to recover.
In summary, between 2:40 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., approximately 2 billion
shares were traded with a total volume exceeding $56 billion. Over 98% of
all shares were executed at prices within 10% of their 2:40 p.m. value.
1Nanex is a firm that offers streaming data on all market transactions and distributes
the data in real time to clients and allows them to do analysis and visualization in real
time
2CB is a technique that is used by markets to halt or slow trading in order to prevent
potential market failure [16]
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2.3 Main reasons of the Flash Crash
The Flash Crash has raised many questions concerning the efficiency of the
information system supporting the stock market. A deep analysis of the Flash
Crash shows that many of the reasons that led to the failure can be avoided
if the IQ requirements of the system were captured properly during the early
phases of the system design. Several researchers investigated specific cases
of IQ and their effects on the overall performance of the stock market (e.g.,
[13, 13]),and different theories have been proposed to explain what happened,
including:
• Fat-finger trade that is a human error caused by pressing a wrong key
when using a computer to input data. However, this theory was quickly
disproved after it was determined that the E-mini S&P 500 contracts
(the trade that was under suspicion of triggering the Flash Crash) was
not a result of a fat-finger trade [11, 11];
• The highly fragmented nature of the finical market along with the inef-
ficient coordination mechanisms among the CBs of the trading markets
also played a role in the Flash Crash [16, 41]. More specifically, trad-
ing markets should coordinate their CBs. Otherwise, HFTs will simply
search for a market other than the closed ones and continue trading
[24]. For instance, during the Flash Crash CME employs its CB but
NYSE did not [41].
• The behavior of HFTs that effects the market prices and contributed
to the Flash Crash[36, 7, 20].
• Fraud information (intentionally falsified information [23]) that have
been used by some actors and compromised the overall system per-
formance (e.g., HFTs’ flickering quotes3 [26], Market Makers’ stub
quotes4, such orders can also be considered as falsified information;
since they are orders were not intended to be performed [20], etc.).
• Sommerville et al. [40] argue that the failure(s) , which led to the Flash
Crash was not caused by a mere software (technical) failure(s), but it
was due to undetected vulnerabilities that manifested themselves in the
3Quotes that last very short time, which make them unavailable for most of traders
4Orders with prices far away from the current market prices
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interactions of independently-managed software systems that led to a
failure in the socio-technical systems in which the HFTs operate. In
other words, the Flash Crash can be best understood as a failure in a
large-scale complex socio-technical system [8].
3 Capturing Information Quality
The quality of information can be defined based on its “fitness for use”, yet
such definition do not explicitly capture the “fitness for use” for “what” and
the “fitness for use” of “who”, which is very important when information
have several stakeholders, who may require different (might be conflicting)
quality needs. In other words, existing definitions of IQ lake a clear semantics
to capture IQ requirements taking into consideration the different needs of
their stakeholders. Without having such semantics, it is hard to determine
whether IQ “fits for use” or not.
Several IQ models and approaches have been propose [23, 31], yet most of
them propose a holistic method for analyzing IQ (one size fits all), i.e., they
consider a user-centric view [46] without taking into consideration the relation
between information and its different purposes of usage. For example, in
Figure 1 we can see a stock investor (e.g., John) who wants to send a sell/
buy order to a stock market through a stock trader. This simple scenario
raises several questions: Do all the stakeholders (e.g., investor, trader, and
stock market) have the same purpose of information usage? How we can
define the quality of the buy/sell order based on the different purposes of
usage? Should the stakeholders require the same quality of information? If
not, how do their needs differ? Actually, the previous questions cannot be
properly answered without defining a clear semantics among information, its
quality, and the stakeholders’ intended purposes of information usage.
Moreover, IQ can be characterized by different dimensions [43, 6] that
can be used to analyze IQ, including: accuracy, completeness, consistency,
timelines, accessibility, trustworthiness, etc. However, we only focus on 4
IQ dimensions, namely: accuracy, completeness, timeliness and consistency,
since they are the main IQ dimensions, and they enable us to address the
IQ related problems we consider in this paper. These dimensions can be de-
fined as follows: Accuracy: means that information should be true or error
free with respect to some known, designated or measured value[5]; Com-
pleteness: means that all parts of information should be available [5, 43];
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Timeliness: means to which extent information is valid in term of time [31];
Consistency: means that multiple records of the same information should
be the same across time [5].
After defining these dimensions, we need to ask several more questions,
should the different stakeholders consider the same IQ dimensions for analyz-
ing IQ? Do they analyze these dimensions by the same ways? For instance,
can information validity be analyzed by an actor who requires to send infor-
mation, and an actor who requires to receive (read) information by the same
way? The same question can be asked about other dimensions. Moreover,
most of the proposed IQ approaches ignore the social/ intentional aspects
that underlie some of these IQ dimensions. Ignoring such aspects during
the system design leaves the system open to different kinds of vulnerabilities
that might lead to various kinds of failures (e.g., actors might intentionally
provide falsified information).
4 Extending secure Tropos with IQ modeling
concepts
In order to capture the stakeholders’ requirements concerning IQ, secure Tro-
pos modeling language needs to be able to provide the required concepts and
constructs for capturing the stakeholders’ different purposes of information
usage, and the different relations among the purposes of usage and IQ in
terms of its dimensions. From this perspective, we extend the conceptual
model of secure Tropos to accommodate the following concepts:
Goal-Information interrelation: we need to provide the required con-
cepts to capture the different relations between goals and information usage.
Thus, we extend secure Tropos by introducing 3 different concepts that are
able to capture such relations:
Produces : indicates that an information item can be created by achieving
the goal that is responsible of its creation process;
Reads : indicates that a goal consume an information item. Reads relation
can be strictly classified under, Optional : indicates that information
is not required for the goal achievement, i.e., the goal can be achieved
even such information has not been provided; Required : indicates that
information is required for the goal achievement, i.e., the goal cannot
be achieved without reading such information;
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Sends : indicates that the goal achievement depends on transferring an
information item under predefined criteria to a specific destination.
For instance, in Figure 2 achieving the goal “Perform the trades” produces
“Trade information”. While the goal “Receive sell/buy orders from traders”
optionally reads the “Sell/ Buy orders”, since the goal will be achieved re-
gardless the number of the received sell/buy orders. While goal “Manage
trading environment” requires to read “CME CB info”. At the other hand,
the goal “Perform after sale operations” needs to send “Trade info” to the
bank that is responsible of finalizing the trade. These different relations are
represented as edges labeled with produce, send[destination][time], read [R]
and read [O] to represent produces, sends, optionally read and required read
respectively.
Information accuracy: we need to provide the required concepts that
enable for deciding whether information is accurate or not from different
perspectives of its stakeholders. In particular, information accuracy can be
analyzed based on its production process, since information can be seen as
product [3, 37], and many of the product quality concepts can be applied
to it. In other words, the accuracy of information is highly affected by its
source [10]. Moreover, actors might depend on one another for information
to be provided, and the provision process might also affect the accuracy of
the provided information. More specifically, the accuracy of information can
be analyzed based on its sources along with its provision process.
We rely on the notion of trust that has been proposed in secure Tropos to
analyze the accuracy of information based on its source (trusted/distrusted
source) and provision process (trusted /distrusted provision). For instance, a
market considers information it receives as accurate, if a trust relation holds
between the market and information source (e.g., trader), and if information
has been provided through a trusted provision. The same can be applied to
information that is send, i.e., send information is accurate from the perspec-
tive of its sender, if a trusted provision holds between the sender and the
final destination of information. Such relation is shown in Figure 2 as edges
labeled with T concerning the provided information (“Inv sell/buy orders”)
between John (investor and Small marketCo1 (stock market).
Information completeness: we need to provide the required concepts
to capture the relation between an information item and its sub-items (if
any), which enables us to decide whether information is complete for achiev-
ing a specific goal or not. We rely on the “part of” concept that has been used
12
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Figure 2: A partial goal model of the Flash Crash extended with IQ related
constructs
in several areas (e.g., natural language, conceptual modeling, etc.) to model
the relation between an information item and its sub parts. Moreover, we
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provide the purpose of use along withrelated to the purpose of use concepts to
capture information completeness for achieving a specific goal (information
is complete for achieving a goal), where the first concept is used to capture
the intended purpose of information usage, and the last is used to define all
information sub parts related the defined purpose of use.
For example, one main reason of the Flash Crash was the effect of un-
coordinated Circuit Breaker CBs among the markets. Such failure resulted
due to depending on incomplete information by markets for their CBs. In
particular, in stock market domain, the same security might be traded in
different markets. Thus, in order to coordinate the CBs activities among the
different markets that trade the same security, markets should be aware of
one another activities concerning any change in the trading frequency. In
other words, when a market halts or go into slow trading mode for a specific
security, all markets trading the same security should do the same.
More specifically, information produced by the primary listing market is
considered as related to the purpose of use for CB information of any market
that trade the same security, which result in considering the CB information
of the primary listing market (CME) as a sub part of the CB information
of other markets (e.g., NYSE, Nasdaq). Similarly, the main listing market
should be aware of the different activities performed by the markets that
trade the same securities. Thus, NYSE and Nasdaq CB information is con-
sidered as sub parts of CB information that is used by the primary market
(CME). Such relation is shown in Figure 2 as edges labeled with part of be-
tween “CME CB info” and both its sub-items “NYSE CB info” and “Nasdaq
CB info”.
Information timeliness: we need to provide the required concepts that
enable for deciding whether information is valid in terms of time for its
purpose of usage. Since we already defined two different relations between
goals and information that can be affected by time aspects (e.g., reads and
sends), we need to define validity that fits the needs of each of these relations:
Read timeliness : in order to ensure that information is valid for read,
we need to ensure that its value in the system represents its value in
the real world. Lack of timeliness leads to situations where the value
of information in the system does not accurately reflects its value in
the real world [43]. We rely on Ballou et al. [3] work to analyze the
timeliness of read information depending on its currency (age): the
time interval between information creation (or update) to its usage
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time [46, 31]) and its volatility : the change rate of information value
[46], i.e., information is not valid, if its currency (age) is bigger than
its volatility interval, otherwise it is valid.
Send timeliness : is used to capture the validity of information at its desti-
nation in terms of time. In particular, it defines the allowed amount of
time for information to reach its destination, which should be defined
based on the needs of information sender.
Referring to Figure 2, the achievement of the goal “Perform after trade
operations” is subject to the validity of “Trade info” at its destination [bank],
if information was not valid (delivered within the defined send [time]), the
goal will not be achieved. While the achievement of the investor’s goal “An-
alyze the market depending on trader” depends on the validity of “Tr trading
suggestions” that is provided by the trader, in order for such information to
be valid, it should be provided within a time interval that is less than its
volatility change rate.
Information consistency: we need to provide the required concepts
that enable for deciding whether information is consistent or not. Infor-
mation consistency arises only when there are multiple records of the same
information that are being used by several actors for interdependent purposes
(goals), and we call such actors as interdependent readers. While if actors
use the same information for independent purposes, inconsistency will not
be an issue since the actors’ activities are independent. For example, CBs
information should be consistent among all markets trade the same secu-
rities, since they depend on such information for controlling their trading
environment (interdependent purposes). While the same information can be
used by a trader for analyzing the market and make trading decision, yet in-
consistency between information a trader use and the ones used by markets
will not produce any problem, since such information is used for independent
purposes.
Moreover, consistency in our work is a time related aspect 5, i.e., the
value of information among its different interdependent readers might became
inconsistent due to time related aspects. In particular, to ensure consistency
among the different interdependent readers, we need to ensure that these
readers depend on the same information value in term of time. Thus, we
define read-time that indicates the actual read time by information reader,
5In [46] consistency was used to refer to “representational consistency” of information
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and by ensuring that all interdependent readers have the same read-time, we
can ensure the consistency of such information. Considering our example,
to ensure the consistency of “CME CB info” among all markets that trade
the same security (interdependent readers), all of these markets (e.g., NYSE,
Nasdaq) should have the same read-time, i.e., such information should be
provided to them in a way that ensure all of them have the same read-time.
Actor’s social interactions and IQ: actors’ interactions might affect
IQ. Thus, we need to provide the required concepts to capture how such in-
teractions might affect IQ in terms of its different dimensions. To get better
understanding of actors interactions and IQ, we depend on what is called
information provenances [38], which enable us to capture any information
that helps in determining the history of information, starting from its source
and the process by which it has been delivered to its destination [35]. In
particular, information accuracy can be influenced by the trustworthiness of
information production along with its provision process (discussed earlier).
At the other hand, information validity can also be affected by actors’ in-
teractions. More specifically, information provision time 6 might influence
information read and send timeliness, or even information consistency, if
there are interdependent readers of the provided information.
All new concepts along with the basic constructs of secure Tropos mod-
eling language are structured in terms of a meta-model shown in Figure 3,
where we identify: an actor that covers two concepts (role and agent) and it
may have a set of goals, it aims for. Further, an actor may have the related
capabilities for the achievement of goals. Actors can be interdependent read-
ers concerning an information item. Moreover, actors may delegate goals to
one another, and they may have information, and provides it to one another,
where provision has a provision time. Goals can be and / or-decomposed,
and they may produce, read, or send information; yet read can be descried
by its type (e.g., optional or required), and its purpose of use that is used
to address both information competence and consistency in the case of in-
terdependent readers. While send can be described by its time attribute.
Information has volatility rate that is used to determine its validity. Further,
information can be composed of several information items (part of ). Finally,
actors may trust one another for goal achievement / information provision.
Finally, in order to allow for the systematic design of the system-to-be, we
6The amount of time information transmission requires from source to destination
(referred to as the transmission time in networks [14])
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Figure 3: Meta-model shows the extended version of secure Tropos
propose an engineering methodology that underlies our extended framework.
The process consists of several steps that should be followed by designers
during the system design; each of these steps is described as follows: (1)
Actors modeling : in which the stockholders of the system are identified and
modeled along with their objectives, entitlements and capabilities; (2) Goals
modeling : the stockholders’ goals are identified and refined through And/
Or-decomposition, and based on the actors capabilities some goals might
be delegated; (3) Goals-information relations : the different relations among
goals and information are identified and modeled along with their IQ needs;
(4) Information modeling : information is modeled, the structure of composed
information is identified, and then information provisions are modeled; (5)
Trust modeling : trust among actors concerning goal delegation, information
producing and provisions are modeled; (6) Analyzing the model : at this step
the model is analyzed to verify whether all the stakeholders’ requirements
are achieved or not; (7) Refining the model : during the model analysis, if
some of the stockholders’ requirements were not achieved, the analysis try to
find solution for such issues at this step.
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Table 1: General predicate
Type Predicates
actor(Actor:a) agent(Agent:x)
role(Role:r) goal(Goal:g)
info(Info:i, Volatility:v)
Actor’s Relations
is a(Role:r1, Role:r2) plays(Agent:a, Role:r)
conflicting roles(Role:r1, Role:r2)
Actor’s Properties
aims(Actor:a, Goal:g) objective(Actor:a, Goal:g)
producer(Actor:a, Info:i, Time:t) reader(Type:t, Purpose:pou, Actor:a, Info:i)
sender(Time:t, Actor:a, Actor:b, Info:i) is responsible(Actor:a, Goal:g)
has(Actor:a, Info:i, Time:t) can provide(Actor:a, Info:i)
can achieve(Actor:a, Goal:g) achieve(Actor:a, Goal:g)
achieved(Actor:a, Goal:g) not achieved(Actor:a, Goal:g)
fits reader(Actor:a, Info:i)
Goals’ Properties
produces(Goal:g, Info:i, Time:t) read(Type:t, Purpose:pou, Goal:g, Info:i)
send(Time:t, Goal:g, Actor:a, Info:i) dependent(Goal:g)
read dependent(Goal:g, Info:i) send dependent(Goal:g, Info:i)
fits send(Time:t, Goal:g, Actor:a, Info:i) fits read(Type:t, Purpose:p, Goal:g, Info:i)
prevented(Goal:g) send prevented(Goal:g, Info:i)
read prevented(Goal:g, Info:i)
Goal Analysis
andDecomposition(Goal:g, Goal:g1) orDecomposition(Goal:g, Goal:g1)
Information Quality Analysis
accurate read(Actor:a, Info:i) inaccurate(Actor:a, Info:i)
complete read(Actor:a, Info:i) incomplete read(Actor:a, Info:i)
partOf(Info:i, Info:i1) composed(Info:i)
composedOfOne(Info: i) composedOfTwo(Info: i)
numOfParts(Info: i, Number: n) used for(I, PoU)
relatedToPurpose(PoU, I1)
valid read(Actor:a, Info:i) invalid read(Actor:a, Info:i)
read time(Time:t, Actor:a, Info:i)
consistent read(Actor:a, Info:i) inconsistent reader(Actor:a, Info:i)
numOfReaders(Info:i, Number:n) only reader(Actor:a, Info:i)
interdependent readers(Actor:a, Actor:b, Info:i)
Actors’ Social Relations
provide(Time:t , Actor:a, Actor:b, Info:i) prvChain(Time:t, Actor:a, Actor:b, Info:i)
delegate(Actor:a, Actor:b, Goal:g) deleChain(Actor:a, Actor:b, Goal:g)
trust(Actor:a, Actor:b, Type:t, Info:i) trustChain(Actor:a, Actor:b, Type:t, Info:i)
5 Reasoning about Information Quality re-
quirements
We use Datalog [2] to formalize the concepts that have been introduced, along
with the required axioms. Table 1 introduces the general predicates. While
Table 2 lists the actors’ objectives, entitlements and capabilities related ax-
ioms. For example, O1 states that if an actor aims for a goal, it became an
objective for the actor. E1 states that an actor became responsible of a goal
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Table 2: Actors Objectives, Entitlements and Capabilities Axioms
Actor’s objectives
O1 objective(A, G) :- aims(A, G).
O2 objective(A, G) :- deleChain(B, A, G), objective(B, G).
O3 objective(A, G1) :- andDecomposition(G, G1), objective(A, G).
O4 objective(A, G1) :- orDecomposition(G, G1), objective(A, G).
Actor’s entitlements
E1 is responsible(A, G) :- objective(A, G), can achieve(A, G), not not leaf(G).
E2 reader(Type, PoU, A, I) :- is responsible(A, G), read(Type, PoU, G, I).
E3 sender(T, A, B, I) :- is responsible(A, G), send(T, G, B, I).
E4 not leaf(G) :- andDecomposition(G, G1).
E5 not leaf(G) :- orDecomposition(G, G1).
Actor’s capabilities
C1 producer(A, I, T) :- achieve(A, G), produces(G, I, T).
C2 has(A, I, T) :- producer(A, I, T).
C3 can provide(A, I) :- has(A, I, T).
C4 has(A, I, T) :- prvChain(T, B, A, I), can provide(B, I).
C5 can achieve(A, G) :- play(A, R), can achieve(R, G).
C6 can achieve(A, G) :- deleChain(A, B, G), can achieve(B, G).
C7 can achieve(A, G) :- orDecomposition(G, G1), can achieve(A, G1).
C8 can achieve(A, G) :- andDecomposition(G, G1), andDecomposition(G, G2),
can achieve(A, G1), can achieve(A, G2), G1 != G2.
achievement, if the goal is an objective of the actor and the actor has the
capabilities to achieve it. While C1 states that an actor became information
producer, if the actor achieves the goal that is responsible of information
production.
Table 3 lists IQ related axioms. For example, IQ1 states information fits
for send for its sender, if a valid provision chain holds between its sender and
its destination with a provision time less than the time required by its sender.
IQ3 states that information fits for read from the perspective of its reader
if it was accurate, complete, valid and consistent. While IQ4-26 provide the
axioms required to analyze information accuracy, completeness, validity and
consistency.
Table 4 lists axioms concerning the different relations among goals/ infor-
mation. For example, G1-2 state that a goal is dependent if it was information
read dependent or information send dependent. In table 5 lists the actors
social relations concerning information provision/ producing (S1, S2), goals
delegation (S3, S4), along with trust relations among the actors (S5, S6). Fi-
nally, table 6 lists axioms used to identify whether a goal is achieved or not
from the perspective of the actor, who aims for it. For example, A1 states
19
Table 3: Information Quality Axioms
IQ1 fits send(T,G,B,I):- is responsible(A,G), prvChain(Tr,A,B,I),
trustChain(A,B,provide,I), #int(T), #int(Tr), Tr<T .
IQ2 fits read(T,PoU,G,I):- is responsible(A,G), reader(T,PoU,A,I), fits reader(A,I).
IQ3 fits reader(A,I):- accurate read(A,I), complete read(A,I), valid read(A,I),
consistent read(A,I).
IQ4 accurate read(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), not inaccurate(A,I).
IQ5 inaccurate(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), producer(B,I,T), not trust(A,B,produce,I).
IQ6 inaccurate(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), producer(B,I,T), not trustChain(A,B,provide,I).
IQ7 complete read(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), has(A,I, ), not composed(I).
IQ8 complete read(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), has(A,I, ), composedOfOne(I),
partOf(I,I1), has(A,I1, ).
IQ9 complete read(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), has(A,I, ), composedOfTwo(I),
partOf(I,I1), partOf(I,I2),has(A,I1, ), has(A,I2, ), I1 != I2.
IQ10 composedOfOne(I):- numOfParts(I,1).
IQ11 composedOfTwo(I):- numOfParts(I,2).
IQ12 composed(I):- composedOfOne(I).
IQ13 composed(I):- composedOfTwo(I).
IQ14 numOfParts(I, X):- partOf(I,I1),#countZ:partOf(I,Z)=X.
IQ15 used for(I, PoU):- read(T, PoU, A, I).
IQ16 partOf(I, I1):- used for(I, PoU), relatedToPurpose(PoU, I1).
IQ17 incomplete read(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), not complete read(A,I).
IQ18 valid read(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), read time(T,A,I),
info(I,V), #int(T), #int(V), V >T.
IQ19 invalid read(A,I):- reader(T,PoU,A,I), not valid read(A,I).
IQ20 consistent read(A,I):- only reader(A,I).
IQ21 only reader(A,I):- reader( , ,A,I), numOfReaders(X,I), X=1.
IQ22 numOfReaders(X,I):- reader( , ,A,I), #countZ:reader( , ,Z,I) =X.
IQ23 consistent read(A,I):- reader( , ,A,I), not only reader(A,I) ,not
inconsistent reader(A,I).
IQ24 inconsistent reader(A,I):- interdependent readers(A,B,I), read time(X,A,I),
read time(Y,B,I),#int(X), #int(Y), X != Y, A!=B.
IQ25 read time(T,A,I):- reader( , ,A,I), has(A,I,T).
IQ26 interdependent readers(A,B,I):- reader( ,PoU,A,I), reader( ,PoU,B,I), A!=B.
that a goal is achieved for an actor, if the goal is not information dependent
and the actor took the responsibility of achieving it by itself.
Further, we define a set of properties (shown in Table 7) that are used
Table 4: Goal-Information Axioms
G1 dependent(G):- read dependent(G,I).
G2 dependent(G):- send dependent(G,I).
G3 read dependent(G,I):- read( ,PoU,G,I).
G4 send dependent(G,I):- send(T,G,B,I).
G5 prevented(G):- read prevented(G,I).
G6 prevented(G):- send prevented(G,I).
G7 send prevented(G,I):- send(T,G,B,I), not fits send(T,G,B,I).
G8 read prevented(G,I):- read(r,PoU,G,I), not fits read(r,PoU,G,I).
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Table 5: Social Relations Axioms
S1 prvChain(T, A, B, I) :- provide(T, A, B, I).
S2 prvChain(Z, A, C, I) :- provide(X, A, B, I), prvChain(Y, B, C, I),
#int(X),#int(Y), #int(Z), Z = X + Y.
S3 deleChain(A, B, G) :- delegate(A, B, G).
S4 deleChain(A, C, G) :- delegate(A, B, G), deleChain(B, C, G).
S5 trustChain(A, B, O, S) :- trust(A, B, O, S).
S6 trustChain (A, C, O, S) :- trust(A, B, O, S), trustChain(B, C, O, S).
Table 6: Goals Achievement Axioms
A1 achieve(A, G) :- is responsible(A, G), not dependent(G).
A2 achieve(A, G) :- is responsible(A, G), dependent(G), not prevented(G).
A3 achieved(A, G) :- achieve(A, G).
A4 achieved(A, G) :- deleChain(A, B, G), trustChain(A, B, achieve, G), achieve(B, G).
A5 achieved(A, G) :- andDecomposition(G, G1), andDecomposition(G, G2),achieved(A, G1),
achieved(A, G2), G1 != G2 .
A6 achieved(A, G) :- orDecomposition(G, G1), achieved(A, G1).
A7 not achieved(A, G) :- aims(A, G), not achieved(A, G).
to verify the correctness and consistency of the requirements model. These
properties define constraints that the designers should consider during the
system design.
Pro1 states that the model should not include any goal that is not
achieved from the perspective of the actor, who has it within its objectives.
Goal might not be achieved due to several reasons (e.g., delegating the goal
with no trust chain, missing required information, IQ related issues, etc.).
For example, in Figure 2 Sarah delegates the goal “making profit by trading
securities” with no trust chain to Small tradCo 1. This leaves Sarah with no
guarantee that its goal will be achieved.
Pro2-3 state that the model should not include any information unavail-
ability related issues, i.e., senders / required readers should have the informa-
tion they intend to send/ read. Note that capturing information availability
is not a trivial task. For example, in Figure 2 if the goal “Perform the trades”
was not achieved, information “Trade info” will not be produced, and both
goals “Perform after trades operations” and “Analyzing the trading environ-
ment” will not be achieved as well, since both of them require to read “Trade
info”. Similarly, the effect of not achieving these goals might be propagated
to other goals.
Pro4-5 state that the model should not include any inaccurate informa-
tion from the perspectives of their readers, i.e., there is no guarantee that
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information is accurate for read, if it was not produced by a trusted source
(Pro4), and provided by a trusted provision (Pro5). Intentionally falsified
information (inaccurate from the reader’s perspective) was a main reason
that led to the Flash Crash. In particular, some HFTs were accused of pro-
viding orders that last very short time, which make them unavailable to most
traders, in order to affect the prices of some securities before starting their
real trades. Moreover, Market Makers and in order to fulfill their obligations
concerning providing sell / buy orders in the market, provide what is called
“stub quotes” (falsified information). During the Flash Crash, over 98% of
all trades were executed at prices within 10% of their values before the crash
because of “stub quotes” [20]. In particular, if orders that have been pro-
vided by both HFTs and Market Makers were not considered accurate for
granted, such crash might be avoided.
Pro6 states that the model should not include information that is not
complete from the perspective of its reader. For example, after considering
“CME CB info” as a part of “NYSE CBs information”, Pro6 is able to detect
and notify the designer, if NYSE does not has “CME CB info”.
Pro7 states that the model should not include any invalid information
from the perspective of their readers. For example, a Small Tradco 1 provides
John with “Tr trading suggestions”. Yet, the delivery time should not exceed
the information volatility rate to be considered as valid. Otherwise, John may
make wrong trading decisions based on invalid (old) information.
Pro8 states that the model should not include any interdependent reader
that depend on inconsistent information. Considering our example, NYSE
and Nasdaq are interdependent readers concerning “CME CB info”. Pro8 is
able to detect and notify the designer, if “CME CB info” is not consistent
between both of them, i.e., they do not have the same read-time.
Pro9 states that the model should not include inaccurate information at
their destination from the perspective of their senders, i.e., a trusted pro-
vision chain should hold between the sender and its intended destination.
While Pro10 states that the model should not include invalid information
at their destination from the perspective of their senders. For example, stock
traders (e.g., Small TradCo 1 ) have different quality of services, including
the time that orders require to reach the market (milliseconds might be very
important). If a Small TradCo 1 is not able to provide the time to mar-
ket that John requires, his orders will not be considered as valid from his
perspectives.
Pro11 states that the model should not include any agent that plays
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Table 7: Properties of the design
Pro1 :- objective(A,G), not achieved(A,G)
Pro2 :- sender(T,A,B,I), not has(A,I,Z)
Pro3 :- reader(required,P,A,I), not has(A,I,Z)
Pro4 :- reader(T,P,A,I), producer(B,I), prvChain(T,B,A,I), not trust(A,B,produce,I)
Pro5 :- reader(T,P,A,I), producer(B,I), prvChain(T,B,A,I), not trustChain(B,A,provide,I)
Pro6 :- reader(T,P,A,I), not complete(A, I)
Pro7 :- reader(T,P,A,I), prvChain(T,B,A,I), producer(B,I), info(I,V), not T<V
Pro8 :- reader(T,P,A,I), interdependent reader(A,I), not consistent(A,I)
Pro9 :- sender(T,A,B,I), prvChain(T,A,B,I), not trustChain(A,B,provide,I)
Pro10 :- sender(T,A,B,I), prvChain(Tr,A,B,I), not Tr<T
Pro11 :- plays(A,R1), plays(A,R2), conflicting roles(R1,R2)
conflicting roles. In particular, it is used to ensure that the model manage
separation of duties among its actors to avoid any conflict of interest that
leaves the system open to various kinds of vulnerability.
In Figure 2, we can see that Star Co is playing both roles “Credit assess-
ment firm” and “Consulting firm”. Such situation should be avoided, since
we cannot trust a company for providing accurate consulting information
considering the securities of a company that they get paid to perform their
credit assessment. Pro11 can be used to capture similar situations, such as
firms that provide accounting services along with auditing services to the
same company (e.g., The Enron scandal [30]).
6 Implementation and evaluation
Evaluation is an important aspect of any research proposal; it aims to demon-
strate the utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact. Our framework
belongs to the design science area. Hevner et al. [17] classify evaluation
methods in design science under five categories: observational, analytical,
experimental, testing, and descriptive. We aim to evaluate the applicability
and effectiveness of our framework depending on simulation method (exper-
imental), i.e., execute artifact with artificial data. To this end, we developed
a prototype implementation of our framework7 (Figure 4) to test its applica-
bility and effectiveness for modeling and reasoning about IQ requirements.
In what follows, we briefly describe the prototype, discuss its applicability
and effectiveness over the Flash Crash scenario, and then test the scalability
of its reasoning support.
7http://mohamadgharib.wordpress.com/
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Figure 4: Screenshot of the Eclipse-based tool
Implementation: our prototype consist of 3 main parts: (1) a graphical
user interface (GUI) developed using Sirius8, which enable designers for draw-
ing the model diagram by drag-and-drop modeling elements from palettes,
and enables for specifying the properties of these elements along with their
interrelations; (2) model-to-text transformation that supports the translating
of the graphical models into Datalog formal specifications depending on Ac-
celeo9; (3) automated reasoning support (DLV system10) takes the Datalog
specification that resulted from translating the graphical model along with
the reasoning axioms, and then verifies the correctness and completeness of
the requirements model against the properties of the design.
Applicability and effectiveness: We evaluate our framework by show-
ing its applicability in capturing the IQ requirements along with its effective-
ness in capturing the violation of the properties of the design by applying it
to the Flash Crash motivating example. We used our extended modeling lan-
guage to model the Flash Crash motivating example, and then we translate
the requirements diagram into Datalog formal language. Finally, we depend
on the reasoning support technique that our framework provides to check
whether the requirements model is correct and consistent, i.e., all the prop-
8https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.sirius
9https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.m2t.acceleo
10http://www.dlvsystem.com/dlv/
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erties of the design should hold. The analysis captured several violations of
the properties of the design including:
Inaccurate information : CME market considers information received
from both Market Marker 1 and HFT trades Co as inaccurate infor-
mation, since no trust in information production holds between them
at one hand, and CME at the other. Note that how such situation
should be handled is left to the stakeholders decision. For example,
CME may apply some mechanism to verify the accuracy of informa-
tion received from Market Marker 1, i.e., it can define a min/max order
value for accepting the orders received from textitMarket Marker 1, in
order to reject “stub quotes”. Other mechanisms can be applied for
orders received from HFT trades Co, in order to reject their flickering
quotes.
Inaccurate information due to playing conflicting roles : Star Co is
playing both “Credit assessment firm” and “Consulting firm” roles.
However, we cannot trust a company for providing accurate consulting
information considering the securities of a company that they get paid
to perform their credit assessment. Thus, information produced by
Star Co is considered as inaccurate.
Incomplete information : “CME CB info”, “ NYSE CB info” and “Nas-
daq CB info” are identified as incomplete information from the per-
spectives of their readers, since they miss some sub parts related to the
purpose they are used for (goal they aims to achieve). However, this
can be solved by providing these markets with the missed information
sub items, i.e., providing CME with both “NYSE CB info” and “Nas-
daq CB info”, and providing both NYSE and Nasdaq with “CME CB
info”.
Inconsistent information : both of NYSE and Nasdaq are interdependent
readers concerning “CME CB info”. However, “CME CB info” is pro-
vided to them with different provision times. According to [21], provi-
sion time from CME to Nasdaq was 13 (ms), while provision time from
CME to NYSE was 14.65 (ms), which leads to different read-times be-
tween these two markets, and resulted in inconsistency between them.
Experiments on scalability: to test the scalability of the reasoning
technique, we expanded the model shown in Figure 2 by increasing the num-
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Figure 5: Scalability results with increasing the number of modeling elements
ber of its modeling elements from 188 to 1316 through 7 steps, and investigate
the reasoning execution time at each step by repeating the reasoning execu-
tion 7 times, discarding the fastest and slowest ones, and then computed the
average execution time of the rest. The result is shown in Figure 5, and it
is easy to note that the relation between the size of the model and execu-
tion time is not exponential. We have performed the experiment on laptop
computer, Intel(R) core(TM) i3- 3227U CPU@ 190 GHz, 4GB RAM, OS
Window 8, 64-bit.
Note that the model can be extremely big. According to [29], the numbers
of market participation for the E-mini securities at the Flash Crash day were:
1268 fundamental buyers; 1276 fundamental sellers; 176 market makers; 16
HFTs; 6880 small traders; 5808 opportunistic traders, and the number of
investor is much greater than that.
7 Related Work
A large body of literature has focused on IQ. For instance, Wand and Wang
[43] propose a theoretical approach to define information quality. While
Wang and Strong [45] propose the Total Data Quality Management (TDQM)
methodology, with a main purpose of delivering high quality information
products (IP) to information consumers. TDQM was build based on the
same idea proposed in [44]. Ballou et al. [3] presented an information man-
ufacturing system that can be used to determine the data quality in terms
of timeliness, quality, cost, and value of information products. In their work
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the IQ is a customer driven, i.e., the quality of the information products is
determined by its customer.
Moreover, Shankaranarayanan et al. [37] extend the information man-
ufacturing system model proposed by Ballou to develop a formal modeling
method for creating an IP-MAP. While Scannapieco et al. [34] propose IP-
UML approach that relies on the IP-MAP framework. IP-UML uses the
Data Quality profile as the modeling language; which consists of three differ-
ent models, namely: the Data Analysis Model, the Quality Analysis Model,
and the Quality Design Model. However, all the previously mentioned ap-
proaches were not designed to capture neither the organizational nor the
social aspects of the system-to-be, which are very important aspects in cur-
rent complex systems.
At the other hand, requirements engineering community did not appropri-
ately support modeling nor analyzing IQ requirements of the system-to-be.
For example, Abuse cases [25] and misuse case [39] both did not provide
primitives for modeling IQ needs. While UMLsec [19] propose concepts for
modeling information integrity (IQ related aspect) as a constraint, which can
restrict unwanted modifications of information, yet IQ still can be compro-
mised in several other ways. SecureUML [4] does not consider IQ at all, since
it was mainly developed to model access control policies. Abuse frame [22]
addresses integrity related issues (modification) by preventing unauthorized
actors from modifying information, or prevent authorized actors from doing
unauthorized modifications. Finally, secure Tropos [28] seems to be sufficient
to capture the functional, privacy and trust requirements of system-to-be in
its organizational context, yet it provides no primitives for capturing IQ
needs. In particular, secure Tropos cares about information in terms of its
availability and who is responsible of providing it.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we highlighted the importance of capturing IQ needs of the
system-to-be starting from design phase. We argued that IQ is not only a
technical issue, but it is also an organizational and social issue. Thus, any
solution for IQ should be considered at the organizational level. Moreover,
we showed how IQ can be analyzed through its different dimensions. At
the other hand, we discussed the required extensions for secure Tropos for
capturing IQ requirements, and then we extended its conceptual model with
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the required concepts and constructs for modeling and analyzing IQ require-
ments. In particular, our framework enables system designers to capture IQ
requirements in terms of its different dimensions; taking into consideration
the information intended purpose of usage. Further, it provide the required
analysis techniques to verify whether the stakeholders’ requirements are met
or not, and to detect any conflict among the IQ requirements of the stake-
holders of the system.
For the future work, we intend to extend the IQ dimensions we consid-
ered. Further, the different interrelations among IQ dimensions need to be
studied in more details. Furthermore, information production process needs
more investigation, since information might be produced depending on other
information item(s), and in such cases, the quality of the produced infor-
mation is highly influenced by the quality of the information item(s) that
has/have been used in the production process.
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